

# COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

Vol. XXIII. No. 2.] LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 9, 1813. [Price 1s.

[33]

[34]

## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

**AMERICAN WAR.**—This war, which was spoken of by the hireling of the *TIMES* news-paper and others, with such ineffable contempt, has now assumed a very formidable mien; and those who were so eager for the war, begin to revile each other with regard to the conducting of it.—There are, at this time, three political factions in the country; the one that is in possession of the distribution of the public money; the Whig faction; and the faction of the Wellesleys and Cannings. The two latter would join if they could; but, each aims at the possession of the power of giving places and pensions, and, in short, at being the ministry.—These two, therefore, cannot agree wholly; but, they both attack, though upon different occasions and different grounds, those who are in possession of the paradise of Whitehall.—Amongst other objects of attack is that of *negligence as to the American war*. The Chronicle and the Times are equally bitter against the ministers upon this subject; they revile them for having plunged the country into a war with America without providing a sufficient maritime force to cope with that new enemy. *A sufficient force!* Why, the Times news-paper spoke of the navy of the United States as a thing not worthy of the name; it laughed at “Mr. Madison and his navy;” it predicted that a few months would add that navy to our own; it, in short, spoke of it in a tone of contempt which I should in vain attempt to describe.—And yet, it now blames the ministers for not having provided a sufficient force to cope with that contemptible navy; that navy which was an object of the most cruel ridicule.—The defeat and capture of the *Guerriere*, the *Frolic*, and the *Macedonian* must, of course, be matter of astonishment to those, who listened to the language of these presumptuous and foolish men; but, in what respect are the ministers to blame for it any more than they were for the evacuation of Madrid, and for all the consequences of the unexpected retreat of our army in the Peninsula? The ministers had a great abundance of

ships, of all sizes, on the American station; and what were they to do more? I recollect, and so must the reader, that, at the time of the rencounter between *Commodore Rodgers* and *Captain Bingham*, the words in the mouths of all these writers were: “Let one of our FRIGATES meet with “Rodgers, and we ask no more.” This wish; this challenge, was repeated a thousand times over; the public cannot have forgotten the fact; nay, the sentiment was universal. Upon what ground, then, are the ministers now to be blamed? Are they to be blamed, because, upon trial, it has been found, that our Frigates are not a match for those of America? Are they to be blamed, because they did not entertain a meaner opinion of our frigates, compared with those of America, than any other man in England entertained, or, at least, dared to say that he entertained?—We are told, by the writers in the interest of the two OUT factions, that the Republican Frigates are bigger, longer, have heavier guns, and the like, than our Frigates have.—“The varlet’s a tall man,” said Bobadil when he had been cudgelled.—But, are these new discoveries? Were the facts not all well known before to all these writers, when they so boldly challenged out the American Frigates to combat with ours? When Rodgers attacked Bingham, the size of his ship was well known and particularly described; and, yet, no one then called for heavier ships to be sent out to the American coast.—Why, then, are the ministers to be blamed for not sending out heavier ships?—Besides, they have heavier ships upon the station, and it cannot be their fault if those ships do not fall in with the American Frigates. What are they to do with our frigates? If ours are unable to face the American frigates, what are, I ask, the ministers to do with them? Are they not to suffer them to go on a cruise, lest they should fall in with a tall Yankee? In short, it is another of the tricks of faction to blame the ministers for these misadventures of the navy; and, the attempts made by the ministerial prints to account for our defeat upon the ground of



our inferiority of force is another of the means made use of to deceive the people, and to encourage them in the continuation of the war.—When, until now, did we think of disparity of force? When, until now, did we dream of an English ship surrendering to a ship, the superiority of the force of which it required a minute calculation to show? When, until now, did an English Captain hesitate to attack a ship of a few guns more than his own?—Instead of all the calculations that we have seen in the news-papers; instead of those swelled out accounts of the vast force of the American frigates, we should be plainly told, that we have now an enemy to cope with equal to ourselves as far as his numbers will go.—Amongst all the calculations and computations, however, that we have heard, I have not perceived it any where taken into account, that we have experience, which the Americans have not. Where did Isaac Hull gain his naval experience; and where Mr. Decatur? There are two Decatur, the father and son. They were my neighbours, in the country, in Pennsylvania. They were farmers more than seamen, though the elder went occasionally to sea as commander of a merchant ship. If it be the father who has taken the Macedonian, he must be upwards of three score years of age; and, if it be the son, I am sure it is the first battle he ever was in; for, twelve years ago, he was but a mere lad. The father was a man of great probity and of excellent sense; and, I have no doubt that the son is the same; but, I'll engage, that both have had more experience in raising Indian corn than in naval tactics.—Something, therefore, in our estimates, should be allowed for our superiority in point of experience. We have no officer of the navy, who has not passed a great part of his life on actual service; we have scarcely one who has not been in numerous battles; and, in the unfortunate cases above spoken of, one of the Captains appears to have been of long standing even in that rank.—When we are speaking of the naval preparations of Napoleon, we always dwell upon the difficulty of his forming naval officers; but, here we see, in the case of America, that that is attended with no difficulty at all; we here see gallant and consummate commanders start up in a trice; and, in a moment, is dissolved the charm which bound us in ignorance as to this important species of information.—The truth is, I believe, that, amongst the first qualities of a naval commander, are sp-

riety, vigilance, and consideration for his crew; and these qualities are within the reach of every man. The American government, too, has a wide range for choice; with it no intrigues, commonly called "interest," is likely to prevail; because the possession of the powers of the state depends solely upon the will of the people, and, the government, having such support, is not reduced to the necessity of seeking support from any individuals; and, of course, is not exposed to the danger of being compelled to employ as commanders, or as officers of any rank, persons not recommended by their own good qualities.—This is a very great advantage possessed by the American government; an advantage to which, perhaps, it owes those successes, which we so sorely lament, and which seem to be very likely to form an era in the naval history of the world.—But, let what will be the final result of these transactions, I really can see no good ground for accusation against the ministers on account of the misfortunes that have befallen our frigates. Blamed they may be for the war. There, indeed, there is matter for blame; because, if my reasoning upon the subject be correct, they might have avoided the war without any dishonour to England; but, for this they cannot be blamed by those who are seeking for their places; because some of those very persons were amongst the men who adopted and adhered to the measures which produced the war; and, the rest of them have pledged themselves to prosecute it upon its present ground.—Mr. Canning and Lord Wellesley were, in succession, Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs while the dispute was maintained against the abolition of impressment of persons on board of American ships. Indeed, the former has expressed his disapprobation of the "concessions," as he calls them, made to America, in the repeal of our Orders in Council. Of course he cannot complain of the ministers for going to war; and Mr. Ponsonby, as the organ of the Whigs, distinctly declared, that, if America was not satisfied with that repeal, he would support the war against her.—Not, therefore, being able to find fault with the ministers for the war itself, they fall on upon them as to their manner of conducting it; and, as I think, I have shown, they do this without a shadow of justice.—We, "Jacobins," blame all the three factions; some of them for causing the war, and others for pledging themselves to support it; nor have I the least hesitation to

predict, that, day after day, will tend to convince all persons of impartiality, that we are right.—This war we owe entirely to the presumption inspired by our foolish and venal writers. The language of the late PERCEVAL, who talked of not wishing for the “*destruction*” of America, and who spoke of her as of a power depending on his will for her very existence; this language, which will long be remembered, was the general language of the press. We could not believe it possible, that a government, the whole of the officers of which, President and all, did not receive from the public so much money annually as one of our sinecure place-men; we could not conceive, that a government who did not get more money *for itself* would be able to get money enough to *carry on a war* more than sufficient to last our sloop for a few months. We have now found our mistake; and, indeed, the premises which we had in our eye should have led to a directly different conclusion; for, would not common sense have told us, that the less of the public money was taken by the officers of Government for their own use; the less of it that was devoured by placemen, and by others for no services rendered the public, the more there must be for the Government to employ in the public service? This would have been the rational conclusion; but, to reason thus, suited not those who had, and who have, the control over ninety-nine hundredth parts of the press of this country. They, therefore, represented America as a nation destitute of warlike means; when they should have made an estimate of her resources upon the grounds stated in my last number.—The persons in *high* offices in America are *badly paid*; but (and the fact is worth great attention) those in *low* rank, or, no rank at all, are *well paid*. The former have very small salaries; their gains are much less than those of any considerable merchant or manufacturer, lawyer, or physician; but, the common soldier and sailor are paid at a very high rate; at such a rate as not to make him regret his change from civil life.—I should not say, perhaps, that the former are *badly paid*; because, there is something in the *honour* of high office, which the common man does not enjoy; and, besides, there is something due from every man to his country; and, the greater that is his stake in the country, the less is his right to draw from her purse. Mr. Madison does, I dare say, expend, as *President*, every

shilling of the £6,000 that, as *President*, he receives. And, why should he not? What claim would he have to the title of *patriot*, if he grudged to use his talents for his country; or, which is the same thing, if he refused to use them without being paid for their use? If such were his disposition, what claim would he have to the confidence of his fellow-citizens? But, with the common soldier or sailor, or other inferior person employed by the government, the case is wholly different. He has nothing but his *labour* for his inheritance; he possesses no part of the country; his time is his all; and, of course, he is paid for that time at as good rate as if he laboured for an individual.—Those who speculate upon the *resources* of America should not overlook these important circumstances; but, hitherto, I am sorry to say, that we have almost wholly overlooked them.—I never shall forget the obstinacy of many persons with whom I am acquainted, as to the intention of the American government to go to war. They persisted to the very last, that it was *impossible*. They called the declaration of the Congress “*bullying*,” they said it was “*all smoke*,” and so, indeed, said the hired press, that vehicle of lies, that instrument of ill to England.—They have found some *fire* as well as *smoke*; they have found that the Republicans have something at their command besides words; and, when it is too late, I fear that they will find, that this is the most fatal war in which we have yet been engaged. One effect of it appears to me to be inevitable; and that is, *the creation of a Navy in America*.—Pray, good hired men, do not laugh at me; for I am quite serious when I say, that my fear is, that this war will lead to the creating of a *formidable* navy in America. The *means* are all in her hands, and her successful beginning will not fail to give activity to those means.—A Navy, a military marine, in America, is, to me, a most formidable object. Twenty frigates only would cause an expense to us of millions a-year, unless we resolved to yield the West India Islands at once.—I would not advise our government to look upon the rearing of an American Navy as something necessarily *distant*. America has swelled her population from about two to about eight millions in the space of less than 30 years. Another ten years may see her population amount to twenty millions. From not being permitted “to make a hob-nail,” she has risen to be an exporter of numerous



useful manufactures. I state it as an undeniable fact, that she is now able to supply herself with all the articles necessary to man, even in polished life. And, if this be so, why should she not be able to rear a *Navy*, having already nearly as great a mercantile marine as our own.—Whether it will be for her *happiness* that she should do this is another question; but, that she *will* do it I think is most likely; because, in the mass composing every society of men, there is generally a sufficient number on the side of power and glory to decide the nation in favour of the love of those captivating objects.—This war, therefore, if not speedily put an end to, will, in my opinion, not fail to make America a manufacturing nation, as far as her own wants call for, and to make her also a naval nation; and will thus, at one stroke, deprive us of our best customer for goods, and give us upon the seas a rival who will be daily growing in strength as well as in experience.—In my preface to the republication of Mr. Chancellor Livingstone's *Treatise on Merino Sheep*, I showed how necessarily it would follow from the introduction of flock-keeping in America, that she would become independent of us as to woollens. Nevertheless, and in spite of all the facts which have, from time to time, been published relative to the manufacturing of cloths in that country, there are still men to treat with *ridicule*, aye, even with *ridicule*, the idea of America being able to make her own coats and blankets. I remember, that, while I was in Newgate for two years, for writing about the flogging of the Local Militia, at the Town of Ely, in England, under the superintendence of German Troops, there came a gentleman, who was, I believe, a dealer in wool, to ask my opinion relative to the future commerce with America. After having spent about a quarter of an hour in a detail of facts, which, in my mind, contained *proof unquestionable*, that the woollen trade with America was for ever *at an end*, he began a sentence upon the surprising increase of the manufactures in America, which he concluded in words to this effect: "I dare say, that, in less than *half a century*, we shall not ship a bale of cloth to that country." This put me in mind of the effect that the Botley Parson's sermons used to have upon me; and I lost no time in changing the subject of conversation.—I am not one of those who shall regret this independence of America, which I do not think will prove any injury to England in

the end; but, I could have wished the change to have been *less abrupt*, and effected without war, and without the animosities and the sufferings inseparable from war. To me it appears as absurd as it is unnatural, that the American farmer should not have his coat untaxed at the custom-house in England. I can see no sense and no reason in it. Nor do I see why the people of England, or any portion of them, should make coats or knives, or any thing else for the use of other countries, except merely in such quantities as may be necessary to exchange for wine and oil, and some few other things which really are useful to man. The use of commerce is to effect an exchange of the products of one climate for those of another; but governments have turned it into the means of *taxation*, and, in many cases, that appears to be its only object. An exchange of *English coals* for *French wine*, the former at 30s. a chaldron at Paris, and the latter at 6d. a bottle in London: that would, indeed, be a commerce to be contemplated with pleasure. But a commerce, carried on under a code of prohibitions and penalties, such as those now every where in existence, is not to be desired. It is an instrument of taxation, and an endless source of war, and it is nothing more.—Those, however, who are of a different opinion, may look upon the war with America as one of the surest means of destroying, or, at least, diminishing for ever, the best branch of what they admire; but, while I blame the ministers for the war, I must say, that the merchants and manufacturers (I mean the powerful ones) have no right to blame them. The ministers, in their measures towards America, have done no more than pursue *that same system*, of which those merchants and manufacturers have a thousand times, and in the strongest terms, expressed their approbation. At the out-set of this long and destructive war, who stood forward so readily in support of it as this class of persons? The war-whoop has invariably originated with them. They indulged the selfish hope of seeing themselves in possession of all the trade and all the riches of the world. The English news-papers contain a record of their love of war, of war against any body, so long as it promised *gain to them*. They have, over and over again, called the war which began in an invasion of France by the Duke of Brunswick, "*a just and necessary war*;" but, of late, they appear to have been taught by their *poor-books* and the list of *Bankrupts*,



that the war is not quite so "necessary," however "just," they may still think it. They have, I repeat it, no right to complain against the ministers, who have not deviated from the system of Pitt and Grenville, and who, with regard to America, are only acting upon the very same principles, and pursuing the very same objects, that have been acted upon and pursued from the year 1792 to the present day; and the manufacturers are tasting, as is most meet, of the fruit of the tree of their own planting and protecting.

PEACE.—The following *Petition for Peace*, of the Town of NOTTINGHAM, is worthy of particular attention on account of the facts it states.—"To His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.—Sir, We, the Undersigned, Burgesses, or Inhabitants of the Town, and County of the Town of Nottingham, and its Precincts, beg leave to claim the attention of your Royal Highness, as being the Representative of a Sovereign, whose highest glory we presume it is, that he should be considered as the Father of his People; while we dutifully present, before the Throne, a statement of the Evils from War, experienced by Ourselves, and by Millions beside of His Majesty's vast family: and while we earnestly supplicate, from a Paternal Regard, so becoming an English Monarch, that relief from dire distress, which the speedy restoration of Peace alone can be expected to afford.—On that Royal Power, which was designed to be a blessing and protection to Millions, we call for an exertion of God-like Benevolence, which shall speedily terminate a Contest, unhappily commenced with precipitancy, and direfully prolonged by the exasperated passions and the infatuated understandings of Men. Many are the Motives to Peace, and most powerful, which might be expected to influence the mind of your Royal Highness. A respect for the divine principles of Christianity and Humanity, it may be hoped, will prevent your Royal Highness from being swayed by the representations of Men, whose prejudices, passions, or selfish interests, render them Advocates for the PERPETUITY OF A WAR which, if much longer persisted in, will evidently be accompanied by civil commotion, by famine, and by pestilence. —An awful admonition of our having nearly exhausted the Resources of the Country is painfully obtruded on our

notice by the rapidly increasing Beggary and Wretchedness of Myriads of its industrious and frugal Inhabitants, who, at no very distant period, enjoyed affluence or competence; and also by the obviously increasing INABILITY of our ablest Financiers, even while imposing a most oppressive Taxation, to devise means for raising Supplies in any wise correspondent to the Public Annual Expenditure. —In the largest Parish of this once flourishing, but now miserable Town, nearly a third part of its Population, in consequence of the interruption of Trade, is reduced to the state of PAUPERS; and in the other Parishes of the Town, not less oppressive to those Inhabitants on whom a levy can be made, is the BURDEN OF POOR'S RATES. And we are credibly informed, that a like reduction to Beggary and Want of Multitudes of our Countrymen in the different Manufacturing Towns of this Kingdom, is the consequence of the annihilation of our Trade, and of the increase of the Taxation produced by War.—Additional to these Evils, might be recalled to your Royal Highness's recollection those also, which are inevitable concomitants of the most successful Wars, even when waged by Nations whose resources may be the most ample, and whose condition the most flourishing. —It assuredly cannot be a matter of little estimation with your Royal Highness, that Thousands of brave Men should be extended lifeless on the Field of Battle: that Thousands should perish by the hardships of Warfare: that that there should be Thousands of mourning Widows and Orphan Children: that Thousands of Parents should be hurried to the Grave by the loss of beloved Sons, who were the support of their declining Years: that Thousands should die lingering deaths in Captivity: and that the Majority of the Survivors of a long and bloody Contest, having, in a course of Warfare, experienced interruption to those Moral habits, which promote the harmony, comfort, and welfare of Civil Society and of Domestic Life, should, on the return of a state of Peace, be rendered less valuable Members of Society, and less welcome to the Roofs of their Relations and Friends.—As a speedy restoration of Peace alone can mitigate the heavy Evils we endure, and save the Inhabitants of this Land from impending ruin, and the irrecoverable loss of their once prosperous and enviable Condition; as

“now the ill success and disappointed views  
 “of the Enemy may lead him to listen  
 “more readily to reasonable Conditions of  
 “Peace; we join our afflicted Countrymen  
 “in earnestly petitioning your Royal High-  
 “ness to manifest by some unequivocal Ex-  
 “pression or Public Act of the British Go-  
 “vernment, your truly Royal desire to  
 “seize the earliest opportunity of sheath-  
 “ing the Sword of Slaughter, and healing  
 “the wounds of a long-protracted War:  
 “that thus the Enemy may be precluded  
 “from plausibly throwing the odium of  
 “delight in War and its concomitant mi-  
 “series on your Royal Highness’s pacifica-  
 “tory Government.—We will indulge  
 “the hope that your Royal Highness will  
 “grant the Prayer of our Petition; and  
 “that your Highness’s endeavours will be  
 “effectual in soon restoring to the afflicted  
 “People, intrusted to your Royal protec-  
 “tion, that lasting Peace after which they  
 “so ardently aspire.—Thus may the  
 “blessings of the Peace-maker descend on  
 “your Royal Highness; and thus may  
 “your Royal Father, when called from  
 “his present state of sufferings to a better  
 “World, be enabled to resign to your  
 “Royal Highness, in a state of Peace, that  
 “Throne, which he ascended amid the din  
 “of arms, and on which he has continued  
 “to sit during so many years of war.”

—The statement relative to the paupers is very alarming. The consequences of such a state of things no man can foresee. The news-papers tell us, that a detachment of the Queen’s Bays have been marched into the town; for the purpose, I suppose, of giving relief to the hungry bellies of the people! The writers are assuredly the most callous men that ever breathed. They never, upon any occasion, let slip out, even by accident, a sentiment of compassion for the sufferings of the people. They are always for measures of *vigour* towards them. Vigour, indeed! What vigour is wanted towards a set of poor creatures whom the wind would almost blow away? For my part, however singular my taste may be, I would much rather give a pound to these poor souls at Nottingham than the millionth part of a farthing to the people of Russia, who, as we are NOW told by the Times newspaper, set fire to their own houses, their own goods, their own food, their own sick and wounded soldiers; and, in short, to the whole of the capital of the Russian Empire.—But, more of these impudent lies about Moscow another time: the poor

of Nottingham now claim our attention, and, we are told, that in one of the principal parishes, *nearly every third person is a pauper*. The misery must, in such a case, be dreadful; and it will, I trust, meet due attention from the parliament.

—Perceval used to say, in answer to all applications for relief to such persons, that it would do harm if granted; but, why, then, make grants of relief to the Russians? Why should such a grant do more harm in England than in Russia? Mr. Wilberforce (*formerly* member for Yorkshire and *now* for the borough of Bamber) said, that he had attempted to make a calculation of the sum per head which the Russian £200,000 would amount to, if divided amongst the paupers in England: but that he had found it to be too small to admit of a name. Indeed! Why, there are 4 millions of shillings in £200,000. And, if the worthy representative of the borough of Bamber did not estimate our sons and daughters of misery at more than 4 millions, the £200,000 given to the Russians would have given each of our poor creatures a *shilling*; and would have fed them better than they are now fed for *half a week*. If he considered the number of paupers at 3,000,000, and that is nearly one-third part of the population, the £200,000 would have afforded all our paupers 1s. 6d. each; and, I can assure the member for Bamber, that eighteen pence a-piece would have made their eyes sparkle.—Nay, would not £200,000 have maintained all the paupers in England and Wales *for a whole week*? £200,000, multiplied by 52, gives the sum of £10,400,000; and, I believe, that, at the last return laid before parliament, the total amount of the poor-rates, in England and Wales, for one year, was less than £6,000,000. Indeed, I know that it was so; and, therefore, unless the poor-rates have *nearly doubled in amount during the last ten years*, the member for Bamber will find, that this grant to the poor of Russia would have maintained all the poor in England *for one whole week*; and, would it have been *nothing* to give them a double allowance for a week? Would it be *nothing* to give all the poor of our own country a week’s food in this pinching season?—As to the people at *Lloyd’s*; as to the SUBSCRIBING people, let them have their taste; they *subscribed towards the war*, and so did the old, famous old gentleman, who subscribed £10,000 towards the *voluntary contributions*, and





who has since honestly avowed, that he did it *out of the public money*, and for the sake of *setting an example to the public!* This was in due course; but, such examples have no effect, I believe, except on those, who, some how or other, get by the war.—Let these persons give their money to the Russians for setting fire to their own houses, as the *TIMES* tells us, they have their taste; but, one would imagine, that, in the sums voted by parliament, that is to say, in the sums given away out of the taxes raised upon the people of England, some of our own poor creatures, such as those at Nottingham, might be permitted to share with the Russians.—The Russians, we are told, suffer in the war against our enemy; and do not our own paupers suffer from the same cause? Do not they suffer from the imposing of taxes and from the loss of their business? And what do these arise from but from the war?—I should, I must confess, be very glad to hear the reasons, why our poor suffering wretches are not to have a parliamentary grant as well as the sufferers in Russia. But, this is what I shall not hear from any of the hireling writers. This is a topic that they will not touch upon; for, if they were to give *their* reasons; their *TRUE* reasons, they would speak a little too plain even to the people of England.—As to the prayer of the petition, I know not what the Regent may think of it; but, the hireling press, so far from thinking of *peace*,—is, more than ever bent on war. It will now hear of no peace, the path to which is not “*over the corpse of the monster*,” meaning the Emperor of France, and which “*monster’s*” corpse seems, as yet, to be, however, in pretty good health and preservation.—What wisecrackers! They are as wise as they are honest, however; and, the suffering of them, the tolerating of their trash, meets with its just reward. They, like many thousands of others, would *lose* by peace; and, therefore, they are for war.—They will not now treat with Napoleon because he is, as they say, at a *low ebb*; and formerly they would not treat with him, because he swam with the *tide of victory*: so that, according to them, there never can come a time to treat for peace with the ruler of France.—But, I had forgotten, he is *very ill*. Very ill. He does, indeed, preside at Councils, review his troops, and hunt in the woods; but, still the *Times* and the *Courier* will insist, that he is very ill. They, like

Muly Molock, “*know all*,”—He is not ill, nor does he appear to be at all disconcerted at what has taken place in the North. He will organize his plans, in all probability, for another campaign in Russia; and we shall, perhaps, hereafter repent, that we have missed the last opportunity of making a safe and honourable peace.—The people of Nottingham do not seem, however, to view the matter in a right light. They seem to think, that it is the *present ministry* who prevent peace. But, have they heard either of the other factions say a word in its favour? Have they not, on the contrary, heard the other factions blame the ministers for not carrying on the war upon a *more extended scale*? These factions, if they be sincere, want *more war* than we now have, and, of course, *more taxes*. They cry out, that Lord Wellington *wants money*. Aye, I dare say, he does; but, must not we pay it before he gets it? And do we want to pay more money? The fact is, that the *OUT* factions blame the ministers for being *too sparing of our purses*!—We shall have peace at last; but not, in my opinion, while the guinea is so cheap as it now is. It will now sell for only about 29s. 6d. It must be a great deal dearer before we shall, in my opinion, have peace.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 7th January, 1813.

## OFFICIAL PAPERS.

### PROCLAMATION,

Issued by the Emperor Alexander, dated St. Petersburg, Nov. 15.

(Continued from page 30.)

he now, with the small remains of them, seeks his personal safety in the rapidity of his flight; he flies from Moscow with as much fear and depression as he advanced against it with pride and insolence; he flies, leaving his cannon behind him, throwing away his baggage, and sacrificing every thing that can retard the swiftness of his flight. Thousands of the fugitives daily fall to the earth and expire. In such manner does the just vengeance of God punish those who insult his temples. Whilst we, with paternal tenderness and joyful heart, observe the great and praiseworthy actions of our faithful subjects, we carry our most warm and lively gratitude

to the first cause of all good,—the Almighty God; and in the next place we have to express our thanks in the name of our common country, to all our loyal subjects, as the true sons of Russia. By their general energy and zeal, the force of the enemy is brought down to the lowest degree of decline, for the greater part has either been annihilated or made prisoners. All have unanimously joined in the work. Our valiant armies have every where defeated the enemy. The higher nobility have spared nothing by which it could contribute to the increase of the strength of the State. The merchants have distinguished themselves by sacrifices of all kinds. The loyal people, burghers, and peasantry, have given such proofs of fidelity and love for their country, as can only be expected of the Russian nation. They have zealously and voluntarily entered into the hastily raised levies, and have shewn a courage and resolution equal to veteran warriors. They have with the same force and intrepidity penetrated the enemy's regiments, with the same implements with which they only a few weeks before turned up their fields. In this manner the troops of levies sent from St. Petersburg and Novogorod, for the strengthening of the forces under Count Wittgenstein, have behaved themselves, especially at Polotzk, and other places. We have besides, and with heartfelt satisfaction, perceived by the reports of the Commander in Chief of the armies, and from other Generals, that in several Governments, and particularly in those of Moscow and Kalouga, the country people have armed themselves, chosen their own leaders, and not only resisted all attempts at seducing them, but also sustained all the calamities that have befallen them with the perseverance of martyrs. Often have they united themselves with our detachments, and assisted them in making their enterprises and attacks against the enemy. Many villages have secreted their families and tender infants in the woods; and the inhabitants, with armed hand and inconceivable courage, under engagements on the Holy Gospel not to leave each other in danger, defended themselves, and whenever the enemy shewed himself, have fallen upon him, so that many thousands of them have been cut to pieces, and dispersed by the peasants, and even by their women, and numbers taken prisoners, who were indebted for their lives to the humanity of those very people whom they came to plunder and destroy.—So

high a purpose, and such invincible perseverance in the whole nation, does it immortal honour, worthy of being preserved in the minds of posterity. With the courage of such a nation, we entertain the most well-founded hopes. Whilst we jointly with the true church, and the holy synod and clergy, supplicate God's assistance, that if our inveterate enemy, and the mocker of God's temple and holiness, should not be entirely and totally destroyed in Russia, yet that his deep wounds, and the blood it has cost him, will bring him to acknowledge her might and strength.—Meanwhile, we hold it to be our bounden duty, by this general publication before the whole world, to express our gratitude to the valiant, loyal, and religious Russian nation, and thereby render it due justice.—Given at St. Petersburg, the 15th day of November, in the year 1812, after the birth of Christ, and in the twelfth year of our reign.

(Signed) ALEXANDER.

#### UNITED STATES.

##### *Farther Documents accompanying the President's Message.*

*Mr. Graham to Mr. Russell.*

*Department of State, Aug. 9, 1812.*

Sir,—The Secretary left this city about ten days ago, on a short visit to Virginia. Since that period Mr. Baker has, in consequence of some dispatches from his Government addressed to Mr. Foster, made to me a communication respecting the intentions of his Government, as regards the Orders in Council. It was of a character, however, so entirely informal and confidential, that Mr. Baker did not feel himself at liberty to make it in the form of a note verbal or *pro memoria*, or even to permit me to take a memorandum of it at the time he made it. As it authorizes an expectation that something more precise and definite, in an official form, may soon be received by this Government, it is the less necessary that I should go into an explanation of the views of the President in relation to it, more particularly as the Secretary of State is daily expected, and will be able to do it in a manner more satisfactory.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) JOHN GRAHAM.



*Mr. Graham to Mr. Russell.*

*Department of State, Aug. 10, 1812.*

Sir,—Thinking that it may possibly be useful to you, I do myself the honour to enclose a memorandum of the conversation between Mr. Baker and myself, alluded to in my letter of yesterday's date.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) JOHN GRAHAM.

*Memorandum referred to in the above Letter.*

Mr. Baker verbally communicated to me, for the information of the President, that he had received dispatches from his Government, addressed to Mr. Foster, dated, I believe, about the 17th of June, from which he was authorized to say, that an official declaration would be sent to this country, that the Orders in Council, so far as they affected the United States, would be repealed on the 1st of August, to be revived on the 1st of May, 1813, unless the conduct of the French Government, and the result of the communications with the American Government, should be such as, in the opinion of His Majesty, to render their revival unnecessary. Mr. Baker moreover stated, that the Orders would be revived, provided the American Government did not, within fourteen days after they received the official declaration of their repeal, admit British armed vessels into their ports, and put an end to the restrictive measures which had grown out of the Orders in Council.—The dispatches authorizing this communication to the American Government expressly directed, that it should be made verbally, and Mr. Baker did not consider himself at liberty to reduce it to writing, even in the form of a note-verbal, or *pro memoria*, or to suffer me to take a memorandum of his communication at the time he made it. I understood from him, that the dispatches had been opened by Mr. Foster, at Halifax, who, in consequence of a conversation he had had with Vice-Admiral Sawyer and Sir John Sherbrooke, had authorized Mr. Baker to say, that these gentlemen would agree, as a measure leading to a suspension of hostilities, that all captures made after a day to be fixed, should not be proceeded against immediately, but be detained to await the future decision of the two Governments. Mr. Foster had not seen Sir G. Prevost, but had written to him by express, and did not doubt but that he would agree to an arrangement for the temporary suspension of hostilities.

Mr. Baker also stated, that he had received an authority from Mr. Foster to act as Charge d'Affaires, provided the American Government would receive him in that character, for the purpose of enabling him officially to communicate the declaration which was to be expected from the British Government; his instructions to be understood, of course, as ceasing on the renewal of hostilities. I replied, that although so general and informal a communication, no answer might be necessary, and certainly no particular answer expected, yet I was authorized to say, that the communication is received with sincere satisfaction, as it is hoped the spirit in which it is authorized by his Government may lead to such farther communications as will open the way not only for an early and satisfactory termination, of existing hostilities, but to that entire adjustment of all the differences which produced them, and that permanent peace and solid friendship which ought to be mutually desired by both countries, and which is sincerely desired by this. With this desire, an authority was given to Mr. Russell on the subject of an armistice, as introductory to a final pacification, as has been made known to Mr. Foster; and the same desire will be felt on the receipt of the further and more particular communications, which are shortly to be expected, with respect to the joint intimation from Mr. Foster and the British authorities at Halifax, on the subject of suspending judicial proceedings in the case of maritime captures, to be accompanied by a suspension of military operations. The authority given to Mr. Russell just alluded to, and of which Mr. Foster was the bearer, is full proof of the solicitude of the Government of the United States to bring about a general suspension of hostilities on admissible terms, with as little delay as possible. It was not to be doubted, therefore, that any other practical expedient for obtaining a similar result would readily be concurred in. Upon the most favourable consideration, however, which could be given to the expedient suggested through him, it did not appear to be reducible to any practicable shape to which the Executive would be authorized to give it the necessary sanction; nor indeed is it probable, that if it was less liable to insuperable difficulties, it could have any material effect previous to the result of the pacific advance made by this Government, and which must, if favourably received, become operative as

soon as any other arrangement that could now be made. It was stated to Mr. Baker, that the President did not, under existing circumstances, consider Mr. Foster as vested with the power of appointing a Charge d'Affaires; but that no difficulty in point of form would be made, as any authentic communication through him, or any other channel, would be received with attention and respect.

*The Secretary of State to Mr. Russell.*

[Extract.]

*Department of State, Aug. 21, 1812.*

My last letter to you was of the 27th of July, and was forwarded by the British packet, the *Althea*, under the special protection of Mr. Baker. The object of that letter, and of the next preceding one of the 20th of June, was, to invest you with power to suspend by an armistice, on such fair conditions as it was presumed could not be rejected, the operation of the war, which had been brought on the United States by the injustice and violence of the British Government. At the moment of the declaration of war, the President, regretting the necessity which produced it, looked to its termination and provided for it; and happy will it be for both countries, if the disposition felt, and the advance thus made on his part, are entertained and met by the British Government in a similar spirit.—You will have seen by the note forwarded to you by Mr. Graham, of Mr. Baker's communication to him, that Mr. Foster had authorized him to state, that the Commanders of the British forces at Halifax would agree to a suspension, after a day to be fixed, of the condemnation of prizes, to wait the decision of both Governments, without, however, preventing captures on either side.—Sir George Prevost has since proposed to General Dearborn, at the suggestion of Mr. Foster, a suspension of offensive operations by land, in a letter which was transmitted by the General to the Secretary at War. A provisional agreement was entered into between General Dearborn and Colonel Baynes, the British Adjutant-General, bearer of General Prevost's letter, that neither party should act offensively before the decision of our Government should be taken on the subject.—Since my return to Washington, the document alluded to in Mr. Foster's dispatch, as finally decided on by the British Government, has been handed to me by Mr. Baker, with a re-

mark, that its authenticity might be relied on. Mr. Baker added, that it was not improbable, that the Admiral at Halifax might agree likewise to a suspension of captures, though he did not profess or appear to be acquainted with his sentiments on that point.—On full consideration of all the circumstances which merit attention, the President regrets that it is not in his power to accede to the proposed arrangement. The following are among the principal reasons which have produced this decision:—

1st. The President has no power to suspend judicial proceedings on prizes. A capture, if lawful, vests a right, over which he has no control. Nor could he prevent captures otherwise than by an indiscriminate recal of the commissions granted to our privateers, which he could not justify under existing circumstances.—

2d. The proposition is not made by the British Government, nor is there any certainty that it would be approved by it.—

3d. No security is given or proposed, as to the Indians, nor could any be relied on. They have engaged in the war on the side of the British Government, and are now prosecuting it with vigour in their usual savage mode. They can only be restrained by force, when once let loose, and that force has already been ordered out for the purpose.—

4th. The proposition is not reciprocal, because it restrains the United States from acting where their power is greatest, and leaves Great Britain at liberty, and gives her time to augment her force in our neighbourhood.—

5th. That as a principal object of the war is to obtain redress against the British practice of impressment, an agreement to suspend hostilities, even before the British Government is heard from on that subject, might be considered a relinquishment of that claim.—

6th. It is the more objectionable, and of the less importance, in consideration of the instructions heretofore given you, which, if met by the British Government, may have already produced the same result in a greater extent and more satisfactory form.—I might add, that the declaration itself is objectionable in many respects, particularly the following: 1st. Because it asserts a right in the British Government to restore the Orders in Council, or any part thereof, to their full effect, on a principle of retaliation on France, under circumstances of which she alone is to judge: a right which this Government cannot admit, especially in the



extent heretofore claimed, and acted on by the British Government.—2d. That the appeal is founded exclusively on the French Decree of the 28th of April, 1811, by which the repeal of the Decrees of Berlin and Milan, announced on the 5th of August, 1810, to take effect on the 1st of November of that year, at which time their operation actually ceased, is disregarded, as are the claims of the United States arising from the repeal on that day, even according to the British pledge. —

3d. That even if the United States had no right to claim the repeal of the British Orders in Council, prior to the French Decree of the 28th of April, 1811, nor before the notification of that Decree to the British Government on the 20th of May, of the present year, the British repeal ought to have borne date from that day, and been subject to none of the limitations attached to it.—These remarks on the declaration of the Prince Regent, which are not pursued with rigour, nor in the full extent which they might be, are applicable to it, in relation to the state of things which existed before the determination of the United States to resist the aggressions of the British Government by war. By that determination, the relations between the two countries have been altogether changed; and it is only by a termination of the war, or by measures leading to it by consent of both Governments, that its calamities can be closed or mitigated. It is not now a question, whether the declaration of the Prince Regent is such as ought to have produced a repeal of the Non-importation Act, had not war been declared; because, by the declaration of war, that question is superseded, and the Non-importation Act having been continued in force by Congress, and become a measure of war, and among the most efficient, it is no longer subject to the control of the Executive in the sense and for the purpose for which it was adopted.—The declaration, however of the Prince Regent, will not be without effect. By repealing the Orders in Council, without reviving the blockade of May 1806, or any other illegal blockade, as is understood to be the case, it removes a great obstacle to an accommodation. The President considers it an indication of a disposition in the British Government to accommodate the differences which subsist between the two countries; and I am instructed to assure you, that if such disposition really exists, and is persevered in, and is extended to other objects, especially

the important one of impressment, a durable and happy peace and reconciliation cannot fail to result from it.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
*Friday, Nov. 13.*

The following Message was received from the President of the United States, by Mr. Coles, his Secretary:—

*To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.*

For the farther information of Congress, relative to the pacific advances made on the part of the Government to that of Great Britain, and the manner in which they have been met by the latter, I transmit the sequel of the communications on that subject, received from the late Charge d'Affaires at London.

Nov. 12, 1812.

JAMES MADISON.

DOCUMENTS WITH THE MESSAGE.

*Mr. Russell to Mr. Monroe.*

*London, Sept. 19, 1812.*

Sir,—On the 12th inst. I received your letter of the 27th of July last; and the copies of my note to Lord Castlereagh, and of his Lordship's reply enclosed herein, will inform you that the propositions, made in consequence of it, have been rejected.—As I have but this moment heard of the immediate departure of the Friends, I have time only to add, that I have received the communications of Mr. Graham, of the 9th and 10th of August, by the Gleaner, and that I leave London this evening, to embark on board the Lark, at Plymouth, for New York.—I am, with the greatest respect and consideration, Sir, your faithful and obedient servant,

(Signed) JONA. RUSSELL.

P. S.—An interesting interview took place between Lord Castlereagh and myself on the 16th instant, the account of which I must, for want of time, reserve until I have the honour to see you.

*Mr. Russell to Lord Castlereagh.*

(Private).

*18, Bentinck-street, 12th Sept. 1812.*

My Lord,—In consequence of additional instructions which I have received from my Government this morning, I called about noon at the Foreign Office, and found with regret that your Lordship was out of town. My object was to communicate to your

Lordship the powers under which I act, that you might perceive their validity and extent. I have, however, sought to state them substantially in the official letter which I have herewith the honour to transmit to your Lordship, but should you find any thing that stands in need of explanation, previous to being submitted to His Royal Highness, I shall remain at 18, Bentinck-street, to receive the commands of your Lordship. If your Lordship could, in courtesy, find any motive in my personal convenience to hasten to a decision upon the propositions which I have submitted; the season of the year, my anxiety to depart (all my arrangements being made and all my baggage having left town), and the detention of the Lark at much expense, will plead powerfully in my favour. — I have the honour to be, with great consideration, your Lordship's very obedient and very humble servant,

(Signed) JONA. RUSSELL.  
*Lord Viscount Castlereagh, &c. &c. &c.*

*Mr. Russell to Lord Castlereagh.*

18, Bentinck-street, Sept. 12, 1812.

My Lord,—I hasten, authorized by instructions recently received from the Government of the United States, and urged by an unfeigned anxiety to arrest the calamities of war, to propose to your Lordship a convention for the suspension of hostilities, to take effect at such time as may be mutually agreed upon, and stipulating that each party shall forthwith appoint Commissioners, with full powers to form a treaty, which shall provide, by reciprocal arrangements for the security of their seamen, from being taken or employed in the service of the other power; for the regulation of their commerce; and all other interesting questions now depending between them; and that the armistice shall not cease without such previous notice by one to the other party, as may be agreed upon, and shall not be understood as having any other effect than merely to suspend military operations by land and sea.—In proposing to your Lordship these terms for a suspension of hostilities, I am instructed to come to a clear and distinct understanding with His Britannic Majesty's Government, without requiring it to be formal concerning impressment, comprising in it the discharge of the citizens of the United States already impressed; and concerning future blockades, the revocation of the Orders in Council being confirmed.—Your Lordship is

aware that the power of the Government of the United States to prohibit the employment of British seamen must be exercised in the sense and spirit of the constitution; but there is no reason to doubt that it will be so exercised effectually and with good faith.—Such a measure, as it might by suitable regulations and penalties be made completely effectual and satisfactory, would operate almost exclusively in favour of Great Britain, for as few American seamen ever enter voluntarily into the British service, the reciprocity would be nominal, and it is sincerely believed that it would be more than an equivalent for any advantage she may derive from impressment.—By the proposition which I have now the honour to make in behalf of my Government, your Lordship will perceive the earnest desire of the President to remove every obstacle to an accommodation, which consists merely of form; and to secure the rights and interests of the United States in a manner the most satisfactory and honourable to Great Britain as well as to America.—The importance of the overture now made, will, I trust, obtain for it the early consideration of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent; and I shall detain the vessel in which I have taken my passage to the United States, until I have the honour to learn his decision.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, with high consideration, your Lordship's most obedient servant,

(Signed) JONA. RUSSELL.  
*Lord Viscount Castlereagh, &c.*

*Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Russell.*

Lord Castlereagh presents his compliments to Mr. Russell, and requests to have the honour of seeing him at his house in St. James's-square, at 9 o'clock this evening.

*Foreign Office, Sept. 16, 1812.*

N. B. Received a little before 5 o'clock.

*Mr. Hamilton to Mr. Russell.*

Dear Sir,—I have not seen Lord Castlereagh since his receipt of your two letters of the —, but have received his directions to say to you, that he is concerned that he cannot have it in his power to reply to them for a few days, or would have had much pleasure in attending immediately to your request in that respect. You may be assured that no delay will take place which can be avoided.—I am, dear Sir, faithfully your's,

W. HAMILTON.  
*Foreign Office, Sept. 16, 1812.*  
*Jonathan Russell, Esq. &c.*



*Mr. Russell to Mr. Hamilton.*

Dear Sir,—I have learnt with much regret and disappointment, that Lord Castlereagh has directed you to inform me, that it is not in his power to give an immediate answer to the last letters which I have had the honour to address to him. The object of those letters was of a nature to require an early decision. Reluctant, however, by any precipitancy on my part, to protract the present unhappy relations between the two countries, I beg you to acquaint his Lordship, that I shall remain in town until Sunday (the 20th instant), when, unless some special and satisfactory reason be assigned for a longer delay, I shall consider it to be my duty to proceed to Plymouth to embark for the United States.—I am, dear Sir, with great truth and respect, your obedient servant,

(Signed) JONATHAN RUSSELL.  
18, Bentinck-street, 16th Sept. 1812.

N. B. Sent at 3 o'clock.

*Lord Castlereagh to Mr. Russell.*

*Foreign Office, Sept. 18, 1812.*

Sir,—Under the explanations you have afforded me of the nature of the instructions which you have received from your Government, I have, as on the preceding occasion, been induced to lay your letter of the 12th inst. before His Royal Highness the Prince Regent.—His Royal Highness commands me to express to you his regret that he cannot perceive any substantial difference between the proposition for a suspension of hostilities which you are now directed to make, and that which was contained in your letter of the 24th of August last. The form of the proposed arrangement, it is true, is different; but it only appears to aim at executing the same purpose in a more covert, and, therefore, in a more objectionable manner.—You are now directed to require, as preliminary to a suspension of hostilities, a clear and distinct understanding, without, however, requiring it to be formal on all the points referred to in your former proposition. It is obvious that, were this proposal acceded to, the discussion on the several points must substantially precede the understanding required.—This course of proceeding, as bearing on the face of it a character of disguise, is not only felt to be in principle inadmissible, but as unlikely to lead in practice to any advantageous result; as it does not appear on the important subject of im-

propose any specific plan, with reference to which the suspension of that practice could be made a subject of deliberation, or that you have received any instructions for the guidance of your conduct on some of the leading principles, which such a discussion must in the first instance involve.—Under these circumstances the Prince Regent sincerely laments, that he does not feel himself enabled to depart from the decision which I was directed to convey to you in my letter of the 2d inst.—I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant,  
CASTLEREAGH.

*Jonathan Russell, Esq. &c.*

*Mr. Russell to Mr. Monroe.*

*London, 19th Sept. 1812.*

Sir,—Since writing to you this morning, fearing that this Government should infer from my silence an acquiescence in the strange and unwarrantable view which Lord Castlereagh has in his last note thought fit to take of the overtures which I have submitted, and of the powers under which I acted, I have considered it my duty to return an answer, of which the enclosed is a copy.—With great consideration and respect, I am, Sir, your assured and obedient servant,

(Signed) JONA. RUSSELL.

*To the Hon. James Monroe, &c.*

*Mr. Russell to Lord Castlereagh.*

*London, 19th Sept. 1812.*

My Lord,—I had the honour to receive, last evening, your Lordship's note of yesterday, and have learnt, with great regret and disappointment, that His Royal Highness the Prince Regent has again rejected the just and moderate propositions for a suspension of hostilities, which I have been instructed to present on the part of my Government.—After the verbal explanations which I had the honour to afford your Lordship on the 16th instant, both as to the object and sufficiency of my instructions, I did not expect to hear repeated any objections on these points. For itself, the American Government has nothing to disguise; and by varying the proposition as to the manner of coming to a preliminary understanding, it merely intended to leave to the British Government that which might be most congenial to its feelings. The propositions presented by me, however, on the 24th of August and 12th inst. are distinguishable by a diversity in the substance as

well as in the mode of the object which they embraced; as by the former, the discontinuance of the practice of impressment was to be immediate, and to precede the prohibitory law of the United States relative to the employment of British seamen; when, by the latter, both these measures are deferred, to take effect simultaneously hereafter.—Having made a precise tender of such law, and exhibited the instructions which warranted it to your Lordship, I have learnt with surprise that it does not appear to your Lordship that I am authorized to propose any specific plan on the subject of impressment. I still hope that the overtures made by me may again be taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government; and as I leave town this afternoon for the United States, that it will authorize some Agent to proceed thither, and adopt them as a basis for reconciliation between the two countries, an event so devoutly to be wished.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) JONA. RUSSELL.  
*The Right Hon. Lord Castlereagh, &c.*

*Mr. Russell to Mr. Monroe.*

(Private).

*On board the Lark, 7th Nov. 1812.*

Sir,—I have the honour to inform you, that I am now passing the Narrows, and expect to land in New York this day. I conceive it to be my duty to repair to the seat of government, and shall set off as soon as I can obtain my baggage. In the mean time, I am sorry to inform you, that the second proposition for an armistice was rejected like the first, and a vigorous prosecution of the war appears to be the only honourable alternative left to us.—I have the honour to be, with great consideration and respect, Sir, your very obedient servant,

JONA. RUSSELL.

*The Hon. James Monroe, &c.*

LONDON GAZETTE, Tuesday, Dec. 29.

*Copy of a Letter from Captain John Surman Carden, late Commander of His Majesty's ship the Macedonian, to John Wilson Croker, Esq. dated on board the American ship United States, at Sea, the 28th Oct. 1812.*

Sir,—It is with the deepest regret I have to acquaint you for the information of my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,

that His Majesty's late ship *Macedonian* was captured on the 25th inst. by the United States' ship *United States*, Commodore Decatur, Commander; the detail is as follows:—A short time after daylight, steering N. W. by W. with the wind from the southward, in latitude 29 deg. N. and longitude 29 deg. 30 min. W. in the execution of their Lordships' orders, a sail was seen on the lee beam, which I immediately stood for, and made her out to be a large frigate under American colours: at nine o'clock I closed with her, and she commenced the action, which we returned; but from the enemy keeping two points off the wind, I was not enabled to get as close to her as I could have wished. After an hour's action the enemy backed and came to the wind, and I was then enabled to bring her to close battle: in this situation I soon found the enemy's force too superior to expect success, unless some very fortunate chance occurred in our favour; and with this hope I continued the battle to two hours and ten minutes, when, having the mizen-mast shot away by the board, top-masts shot away by the caps, main-yard shot in pieces, lower-masts badly wounded, lower rigging all cut to pieces, a small proportion only of the fore-sail left to the fore-yard, all the guns on the quarter-deck and fore-castle disabled but two, and filled with wreck, two also on the main deck disabled, and several shot between wind and water, a very great proportion of the crew killed and wounded, and the enemy comparatively in good order, who had now shot a-head, and was about to place himself in a raking position, without our being enabled to return the fire, being a perfect wreck, and unmanageable log; I deemed it prudent, though a painful extremity, to surrender His Majesty's ship; nor was this dreadful alternative resorted to till every hope of success was removed even beyond the reach of chance, nor till, I trust, their Lordships will be aware, every effort had been made against the enemy by myself, my brave officers, and men; nor should she have been surrendered whilst a man lived on board, had she been manageable. I am sorry to say, our loss is very severe: I find by this day's muster, thirty-six killed, three of whom lingered a short time after the battle; thirty-six severely wounded, many of whom cannot recover; and thirty-two slightly wounded, who may all do well:—total, one hundred and four.—The truly noble and animating conduct



of my officers, and the steady bravery of my crew, to the last moment of the battle, must ever render them dear to their country.—My first Lieutenant, David Hope, was severely wounded in the head towards the close of the battle, and taken below; but was soon again on deck, displaying that greatness of mind and exertion, which, though it may be equalled, can never be excelled; the third Lieutenant, John Bulford, was also wounded, but not obliged to quit his quarters: second Lieutenant, Samuel Mottley, and he, deserves my highest acknowledgments. The cool and steady conduct of Mr. Walker, the master, was very great during the battle, as also that of Lieutenants Wilson and Magill, of the Marines.—On being taken on board the enemy's ship, I ceased to wonder at the result of the battle. The United States is built with the scantling of a seventy-four gun ship, mounting thirty long 24-pounders (English ship guns) on her main deck, and twenty-two forty-two pounder carronades, with two long twenty-four pounders on her quarter deck and forecastle, howitzer guns in her tops, and a travelling carronade on her upper deck, with a complement of four hundred and seventy-eight picked men.—The enemy has suffered much in masts, rigging and hull above and below water; her loss in killed and wounded, I am not aware of, but I know a Lieutenant and six men have been thrown overboard.—Enclosed you will be pleased to receive the names of the killed and wounded on board the Macedonian; and have the honour to be, &c.

JNO. S. CARDEN.

*To J. W. Croker, Esq. Admiralty.*

*List of Officers and Men Killed and Wounded on board His Majesty's Ship Macedonian, in Action with the United States.*

**KILLED.**—Mr. James Holmes, boatswain; Mr. Thomas James Nankivell, master's mate; Mr. Dennis Colwell, schoolmaster; William Brown, boatswain's mate; John Storvey, captain forecastle; John Wells, captain foretop; Joseph Newell, captain mast; Alexander Johnson, seaman; John Pierson, ditto; John Smith (1), ditto; William Hodge, ditto; William Aldridge, ditto; John M'Wiggin, ditto; John King, ditto; Thomas Curtis, ditto; George Watson, ditto; Thomas Hutchinson, ditto; John Card, ditto; Thomas Kayton, ditto; George Insliff, ditto; William Shingles, ditto; James Beat, ditto; John Hill, ditto; John Wallis, ditto; James Kelly, ditto; James Warren, ditto; Joaquin Joze, Joze de Compass, boys; John Johnson, sergeant of marines; Philip Molloy, private; Edward Skinner, ditto; Matthew Jackson, ditto; William Firth, ditto;

William Miller, ditto; Hugh Hughes, ditto; William Pillipan, ditto.

**WOUNDED.**—Lieutenant David Hope, severely; Lieutenant John Bulford, slightly; Mr. Henry Roebuck, master's mate, slightly; Mr. George Greenway, midshipman, severely; Mr. Francis Baker, volunteer, 1st class, slightly; Samuel Latchford, sail-maker, ditto; James Bulgin, armourer, ditto; James Nichols, quarter-master, dangerous; John Lane, captain foretop, severely; Thomas Homes, captain mast, ditto; Peter Johnson (1), captain after-guard, slightly; Thomas Richards, sail-maker's mate, severely; Elias Anderson, seaman, severely; Richard Stone, ditto, ditto; Thomas Dowler, ditto, ditto; Jacob Logholm, ditto, amputated leg; George Griffin, ditto, severely; Andrew Thorn, ditto, slightly; James Fenwick, ditto, ditto; Thomas Ryan, ditto, severely; John Bates, ditto, slightly; Philip Reed, ditto, amputated leg; William Biggs, ditto, severely; John Gordon, ditto, slightly; Charles Hand, ditto, severely; Giles Edmonds, ditto, slightly; Richard Hiffern, ditto, ditto; Thomas Whitaker, ditto, dangerously; James Duffy, ditto, slightly; James Smith, ditto, dangerously; George Glass, ditto, slightly; Thomas Storkhill, ditto, dangerously, since dead; Emanuel Isaacs, ditto, severely; William Burnett, ditto, dangerously; Daniel Eagle, ditto, severely; James M'Carthy, ditto, slightly; John Wilson (1), ditto, severely; John Active, ditto, slightly; Thomas Steward, ditto, ditto; Michael Beeby, ditto, ditto; Robert Nichola, ditto, dangerously, since dead; Andrew Smith, ditto, slightly; T. Turner, ditto, ditto; Mathew Davison, ditto, severely; David Conner, ditto, dangerously; John Lala, ditto, severely; Thomas Jenkins, ditto, slightly; Richard Sundenwood, ditto, severely; David Nolton, ditto, slightly; Lawrence Mulligan, ditto, ditto; Thomas Gray, ditto, severely; Daniel Nailand, ditto, slightly; Thomas Willicott, ditto, ditto; Charles M'Gibbons, ditto, ditto; Thomas Budd, ditto, severely; James Scratchley, boy, ditto; Robert Hatherly, ditto, ditto; John Jordan, ditto, amputated leg; Robert Sneddon, ditto, ditto; John Duckworth, private marine, severely; John Rutland, ditto, slightly; William Reynolds, ditto, ditto; Benjamin Harrison, ditto, ditto; Lancelot Mills, ditto, severely; Thomas Cox, ditto, ditto; Igdaiah Holding, ditto, slightly; Samuel Browning, ditto, severely; Johan Kells, ditto, ditto.

Killed, 36; severely wounded, 36; slightly wounded, all likely to recover, 32.—Total 104.

(Signed) JOHN S. CARDEN, Captain.

#### RUSSIAN BULLETINS.

*The General of Cavalry Count Wittgenstein makes the following Report to His Imperial Majesty; dated Starroy Berisow, 17 (29) Nov.*

Yesterday I reported to your Imperial Majesty, that I should proceed to the river Berisena, near Studentzy, which I the same day accomplished.—On coming up with the enemy at the above-mentioned passage they halted, and with a very strong force



defended the passage in order to save their baggage and heavy waggons.—Notwithstanding this I drove them from their first position, and pursued them three wersts; the action continued the whole day. To-day I forced them to cross the river at Studentzy, having done which they burned the bridge. Admiral Tschitchagow having sent me pontoons I am now re-establishing the bridge. I shall act in concert with him and Count Platow, on the opposite side.—Yesterday we took from the enemy one gun and 1,500 prisoners; and this day at the passage we took 12 guns, many more having been thrown into the river.—Several Staff and General Officers were taken prisoners, besides others of inferior rank, and more continue to be brought in, which I have not yet been able to take an account of.—The number of waggons belonging to Government and private persons is so great, that a space of half a werst square is so covered with them, that it is impossible either to ride or walk through them; and 3 companies of the new-raised militia have been employed merely to clear a passage for the army.—In these vehicles, which chiefly consisted of carriages of different descriptions, sent from Moscow, we found, besides a very great booty for the army, silver and other articles belonging to the churches, which were plundered by the enemy at Moscow. We are now collecting them, and I shall dispatch them to the Governor of Moscow.—Congratulating your Majesty on the above, I lay at the feet of your Imperial Majesty a stand of colours. The loss in killed and wounded in the course of these two days exceeds 3,000 men.

*Report from General Count Wittgenstein to His Imperial Majesty, dated Berisow, Nov. 28.*

I had the honour, on the 24th November, most submissively to report that Marshals Victor and Oudinot were retreating before me towards Berisow. I marched after them from the town of Tschetuga. General Platow followed the enemy's grand army. Admiral Tschitchagow was to receive the enemy at Berisow, and by this means it was intended to enclose him on three sides. In consequence of this arrangement, I caused my vanguard, under Major General Weastow, to pursue the enemy. This General defeated General Dentiln's division;

near the town of Batura, and within two days, one Lieutenant-Colonel, 36 officers, and 2,000 men were made prisoners. As I then perceived that the enemy was quietly retreating, I undertook making a flank movement from Koloperitche, and marched towards the town of Barau, in order from this point to cut him off from the Lepelska road, and be enabled to act on Wesselowo and Studentzy, where he was forming bridges. When I arrived at the town of Kostrezy, I received information that Napoleon would cross the Berisena river, and that Victor's corps formed his rear-guard; I therefore put myself in march to attack him whilst crossing, and desired General Platow to hasten to Berisow, which he accordingly did. He proceeded on the Tolschschin road, and after my arrival with the whole corps at Old Berisow, I cut off the enemy's rear-guard, consisting of half of Victor's corps, and attacked it on yesterday afternoon. After a heavy fire of musketry, which continued for four hours, and by the effect of our artillery, the enemy were thrown into disorder and put to flight; we took one piece of artillery, and 30 officers, with 1000 men, were made prisoners. He suffered a great loss besides in killed and wounded. Meanwhile I sent a flag of truce to inform the enemy of our superiority of force, and tell him that he was surrounded and must surrender. The courage and valour of the troops under my command, together with General Platow's arrival at Berisow, forced the enemy to send me two flags of truce, with information that they surrendered. At midnight, the General of Division Partinoux, the Brigade General Lettre, two Colonels, 40 officers, and 800 men who had already submitted, were brought to me.—At seven o'clock this morning the remainder laid down their arms, viz. Generals Camusi and Blaimont, 3 Colonels, 15 Lieutenant-Colonels, 184 Officers, and 7000 men, and delivered up three pieces of artillery, three standards, and a number of baggage-waggons. Among these troops are two regiments of cavalry, one of Saxony and one of Berg, with very good horses.—On such a victory, a similar to which has scarcely hitherto been gained over the French, I take the liberty of congratulating your Majesty, and of laying all these trophies at your Majesty's  
(*To be continued.*)